I. INTRODUCTION RECENT reforms in theory and procedure have changed the way victims' attorneys view products cases. Once the poster-child for judicial activism, products liability litigation has been dismantled piece by piece. These broad-spectrum reforms dramatically affect practically every facet of a modern products case, from the need for an expert witness to the amount of damages recoverable. Numerous articles have chronicled the 150-year expansion of products theory. 1 The task of this Article is to manifest that large numbers of theoretical and procedural reforms have dramatically affected the value of the case. Today the victim's attorney must reject all but the largest and most profitable cases. In this article, Professor Davis chronicles the Supreme Court's expansion of the "culture of irresponsibility," where institutional defendants are freed from tort liability with no check on the abuse of such immunity.
Professor Davis describes the Court's progression toward immunity in products liability decisions of the past decade including East River Steamship, Boyle, Cipollone, and Lohr .... Limiting the manufacturer's duty in such broad terms downplays the effort of the previous twenty years to put products liability into the tort arena, not out of it.
Id. at 1075, 1085-86; see also FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL AND Eco-NOMIC ANALYSIS 1-10 (Greenwood Press, Inc. 1989) (providing historical perspective of strict liability theory); Marshall S. Shapo thousands upon thousands of products liability decisions in the past twenty-five years have explicitly referred to, and come to grips with, that section. Among products liability followers one need only identify an issue as presenting "a comment k problem," or to identify a legislative proposal as "a comment i provision," to capture instantly the essence of the relevant debate and incorporate nearly thirty years of legal controversy, development and refinement.
Given that Section 402A has achieved the status of sacred scripture, our proposal to replace it with new text and new comments may strike some readers as blasphemous. What prompts such audacity? Quite simply, doctrinal developments in products liability have placed such a heavy gloss on the original text of and comments to Section 402A as to render them anachronistic and at odds with their currently discerned objectives. By changing the relevant language to conform to current understandings-by restating the Restatement-we hope to clarify much of the confusion that has arisen over the years.
Only recently, while working on this Article, we learned that the American Law Institute itself has decided that the products liability sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, including Section 402A, needs revision.... [W] e have sought to approach the revision of Section 402A cautiously, treating existing language and concepts with considerable respect. Language that has been interpreted by so many courts over such a substantial period of time cannot be cavalierly discarded. At the same time issues that once posed burning questions have now been well settled and new areas of controversy dominate the landscape. We have thus chosen a moderate approach in drafting our suggested revision. We intend to stay as close as possible to shared perceptions of the evolved meanings of the original section and its comments. We do not fancy ourselves as radical reformers, although we express preferences, based on widely recognized normative criteria, where choices are appropriate. Finally, we propose to identify those areas in which true controversy reigns and in which neither predictions nor recommendations are in order. Id. A recent student note summarized the law by stating:
Over the past thirty years, Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has defined American products liability law. Under Section 402A, a manufacturer or distributor is held strictly liable if a product is "unreasonably dangerous" and "defective." This determination depends upon whether the product is in a "condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer." Although most states adopted this formulation either judicially or through legislative enactment, its relevance and application to modern situations has steadily declined. In particular, Section 402A's failure to distinguish between claims involving manufacturing, design, and warning defects required courts to devise appropriate standards for all three types of defects. This dissonance played a key role in the A.L.I.'s decision to open its Iestatement (Third) of Torts with a restatement of products liability law. Traditionally, determining design fitness has presented the most "agitated and controversial" problems in products liability law. Unlike cases involving manufacturing flaws, where courts can evaluate the challenged product against the manufacturer's own production standards as manifested by other units in the production line, cases of alleged design defect, where the product is in its intended condition, do not provide a 846 Vn_.IANOvA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 48: p. 843 emerged. 5 This meant that in order to bring suit, a plaintiff must be in contract with the defendant and, if the person bringing the suit was not in contract, he or she could not sue. Shortly after privity appeared, the courts began to develop legal fictions in order to skirt the privity concept. 6 sentation had been false to the defendant's knowledge, and the plaintiff had acted upon the faith of its being true, and had received damage thereby, then there is no question but that an action would have lain, upon the principle of a numerous class of cases, of which the leading one is that of Pasley v. Freeman (3 T.R. 51); which principle is, that a mere naked falsehood is not enough to give a right of action; but if it be a falsehood told with an intention that it should be acted upon by the party injured, and that act must produce damage to him; if, instead of being delivered to the plaintiff immediately, the instrument had been placed in the hands of a third person, for the purpose of being delivered to and then used by the plaintiff, the like false representation being knowingly made to the intermediate person to be communicated to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had acted upon it, there can be no doubt but that the principle would equally apply and the plaintiff would have had his remedy for the deceit .... We therefore think, that as there is fraud, and damage, the result of that fraud, not from an act remote and consequential, but one contemplated by the defendant at the time as one of its results, the party guilty of the fraud is responsible to the party injured. Id. at 868.
5. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842) (adopting concept of privity first). In Winterbotton, an injured mailcoach driver stied the person who had a contract to repair the mailcoaches. In rejecting the driver's claim the court reasoned:
The contract in this case was made with the Postmaster-General alone; and the case is just the same as if he had come to the defendant and ordered a carriage, and handed it at once over to Atkinson. If we were to hold that the plaintiff could site in such a case, there is no point at which such actions would stop. The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty. The only real argtment in favour of the action is, that this is a case of hardship; but that might have been obviated, if the plaintiff had made himself a party to the contract. Then it is urged that it falls within the principle of the case of Levy v. Langridge. But the principle of that case was simply this, that the father having bought the gun for the very purpose of being used by the plaintiff, the defendant made representations by which he was induced to use it. There a distinct fraud was committed on the plaintiff; the falsehood of the representation was also alleged to have been within the knowledge of the defendant who made it, and he was properly held liable for the consequences. How are the facts of that case applicable to those of the present? Where is the allegation of misrepresentation or fraud in this declaration? It shews nothing of the kind. Our judgment must therefore be for the defendant.
Id.
6. See Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 870 (8th Cir. 1903) (relying on legal fictions to avoid privity requirement). In Huset, the court stated three exceptions [fictions] to the privity rule:
The first is that an act of negligence of a manufacturer or vendor which is imminently dangerous to the life or health of mankind, and which is committed in the preparation or sale of an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life, is actionable by third parties who suffer from the negligence.... The leading case upon this subject is Thomas v.
rily dangerous products and abnormally dangerous products. 8 The ficWinchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455.... In all these cases of sale the natural and probable result of the act of negligence-nay, the inevitable result of it-was not an injury to the party to whom the sales were made, but to those who, after the purchasers had disposed of the articles, should consume them. Hence these cases stand upon two well-established principles of law: (1) That every one is bound to avoid acts or omissions imminently dangerous to the lives of others, and (2) that an injury which is the natural and probable result of an act of negligence is actionable. It was the natural and probable result of the negligence in these cases that the vendees would not suffer, but that those who subsequently purchased the deleterious articles would sustain the injuries resulting from the negligence of the manufacturers or dealers who furnished them. The second exception is that an owner's act of negligence which causes injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective appliance upon the owner's premises may form the basis of an action against the owner. 7. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 894 (7th ed. 1990) (defining legal fiction as "situation contrived by the law to permit a court to dispose of a matter").
See generally
Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N.Y. 124 (1874) (noting that owner of building who negligently constructs scaffold which results in injury to contracted employee is example of "invitation exception"); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (recognizing that druggist who sold deadly poison, which had been mislabeled "extract of dandelion," was example of "inherently dangerous product exception"); Langridge, 150 Eng. Rep at 834 (stating that gun dealer who sold gun and represented it to be safe, but which resulted in injury to purchaser's son upon firing, was example of "misrepresentation exception"). The facts of Winchester were as follows:
Action in the supreme court, commenced in August, 1849, against Winchester and Gilbert, for injuries sustained by Mrs. Thomas, from the effects of a quantity of extract of belladonna, administered to her by mistake as extract of dandelion.... RUGGLES, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action brought to recover damages from the defendant for negligently putting up, labeling and selling as and for the extract of dandelion, which is a simple and harmless medicine, ajar of the extract of belladonna, which is a deadly poison; by means of which the plaintiff Mary Ann Thomas, to whom, being sick, a dose of dandelion was prescribed by a physician, and a portion of the contents of the jar, was administered as and for the extract of dandelion, was greatly injured.
The facts proved were briefly these: Mrs. Thomas being in ill health, her physician prescribed for her a dose of dandelion. Her husband purchased what was believed to be the medicine prescribed, at the store of Dr. Foord, a physician and druggist in Cazenovia, Madison County, where the plaintiffs reside. ...
The defendant was a dealer in poisonous drugs. Gilbert was his agent in preparing them for market. The death or great bodily harm of tions allowed the courts to avoid the concept of privity when they felt that it would accomplish justice.
t ' The impact of the fiction was that a person not in privity was able to sue and recover against the seller of the product. 10 30. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1512-13 (indicating that Section 402(A) has been cited by "thousands upon thousands of product liability decisions").
latures passing numerous statutes of repose holding that a products cause of action could die before the injury even occurred. 3 1 Numerous limitations and inroads into the concept of strict liability and the proof requirements for a products liability case have led to the death of cases with a modest expected value. Part II will deal with reforms in the fundamental products theories. Part III will suggest the various procedural modifications that impact the presentation of the case in the courtroom, resulting in attorneys refusing to take modest cases. Several proposed solutions for victims of products injuries are presented in the Conclusion.
II. CONSTRICTIONS IN LEGAL THEORY
Perhaps the clearest sign of the shift in theory is the novel Restatement (Third), Products Liability, Section 2(b) . 32 This section is important in two respects. First, it practically eliminates strict liability from the products area, and second, it requires the plaintiff to show a reasonable alternative design to the alleged defect in the product. 33 The theoretical, economic and practical problems with Section 2(b) have been presented in several articles. 34 In every respect, Section 2(b) is injurious to the consumer and increases the price of products liability suits by the cost of either an expert witness or the presentation of a reasonable alternative design. 3 35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (1998) (indicating that in order to prevail in strict liability lawsuit, plaintiff must offer evidence of foregone reasonable design).
There have been numerous recent constrictions in strict liability theory, especially in the fundamental concepts of design defect and warning. 3 _ 6 The original purpose of strict liability was to benefit the consumer and prevent him or her from having to prove negligence. 3 7 There are three bases for holding a seller strictly liable. The seller can be held strictly liable if the product contains a manufacturing defect, a design defect or if the manufacturer fails to provide an appropriate warning. 3 It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring). Traynor's concurrence found it significant that mass production of most public goods had all but eradicated the close relationship once held between manufacturer and consumer. See id. (Traynor, J., concurring) ("The consumer no longer has means or skills enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product .. "). 38. See McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 82 (Wyo. 1989) (UrbrigkitJ., dissenting) ("A product may be defective in three ways: (1) manufacturing flaw; (2) defective design; (3) absence or inadequacy of warnings regarding the use of the product.").
39. See, e.g., Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1986) (relating action for design defect to ordinary negligence). The appellate court in Chaulk reversed thejudgment of the district court and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a new trial on the issue of negligence regarding mantufacturer's faulty design of the latch system on its 1977 Volkswagen Rabbit. See id. at 643 (providing court's holding). This latch system was designed in a manner which caused it to release on impact from a side collision and, as a result, the plaintiff was ejected from the car. See id. at 640 (discussing facts of case); see also 41 The tests for strict liability are all over the map and cover a broad range from pure strict liability to negligence. 42 The scope of the various definitions is discussed in detail inJohn Vargo's excellent critique of the Restatement (Third) Section 2(b). 4 3 The impact of this shift toward a negligence test for strict liability is to make it more expensive for a consumer to prove his or her case because the burden of proving negligence is heavier than that for strict liability.
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In 1981, a New Jersey case held that a failure to provide an adequate warning would support an action in strict liability. 4 ' The Supreme Court held that, even though there was no express language in the relevant federal statute, there was express preemption of the plaintiffs allegation of failure to provide an appropriate warning and several aspects of design defect. 6 2 The plaintiffs attorney in the Cipollone case is rumored to have expended six million dollars in his suits against the cigarette manufacturers.'
! -" The case stands for the rule that if you sue a large manufacturer, it is going to spend millions of dollars to defend and force you to spend a like amount.6 4 In the Cipollone case, Rose Cipollone died, her husband (the next plaintiff) died, her son then took over the case and finally voluntarily discharged the suit. 65 The point is that presenting a products liability case is often enormously expensive, and if the law is not in the plaintiff's favor going in (as in Cipollone), the risk of losing is substantial.
In contrast to Cipollone, however, several recent cigarette cases have been brought based on a theory of fraud. 66 In these cases, the attorneys argued that the cigarette manufacturers defrauded the consumers by suggesting cigarettes were safe and failing to disclose that they knew cigarettes 504 (1992) (noting that jury's attributing of eighty percent responsibility to Mrs.
Cipollone barred plaintiff's recovery on failure to warn claim).
62. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-30 (holding that federal statute disallowed plaintiff to claim defect due to manufacturer's failure to provide warning on cigarette carton). One of the leading causes of the constricting of products liability theory is the failure of Congress and the state legislatures to deal responsibly with critical issues in the products area. As with Nero, it is as if the federal and state legislatures are fiddling as thousands of consumers die. The two clearest examples of this are tobacco and firearms. In regard to tobacco, Congress has not adopted any meaningful laws holding the tobacco manufacturers liable for providing a lethal product. Just the opposite is true. Congress expressly provided that the Food and Drug Administration and the Consumer Product Safety Commission lacked authority to deal with the deadly aspects of tobacco. 68 The most dangerous product in the world is tobacco, and it would seem obvious that the Consumer Product Safety Commission would have jurisdiction over tobacco, but the enabling act expressly provides that the Consumer Product Safety Commission lacks such authority.
See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common
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Congress and the state legislatures have also failed to deal with another epidemic, handgun violence. 7 "' Although there are a large number of regulations dealing with firearms, these are only window dressing and deal with the mechanical details of firearms purchase and ownership. 7 '
Even the Brady Bill fails to deal with the major issue, which is the careless saturation of the country with firearms. 72 In failing to address this epi- 73 They have, through omission, substantially contributed to the death of the inner cities, as claimed by Bridgeport, Connecticut, in its suit against the gun manufacturers. 7 4 The almost complete control of the state legislatures by the gun lobby is illustrated by the failure to respond to this epidemic and by the instantaneous reaction of the Georgia legislature in passing an act that forbids cities to sue the manufacturers of firearms in products liability. 7 5 At a Pepperdine Law School symposium, a lawyer for the National Rifle Association (NRA) was proud to state that while attending a gun convention in Atlanta, NRA representatives were able to walk across the street and instantly persuade the Georgia legislature to pass the above-mentioned prohibitive legislation. 76 The Brady Bill is a step forward and has allegedly been successful in preventing gun sales to more than 200,000 criminals, but its critical failure is that it allows the sale of firearms to thousands of citizens every day.
77
This continues the clear and foreseeable danger of children obtaining firearms and shooting other children or their parents, as well as spouses using handguns to kill each other and the large number of shootings of total strangers in the United States. At present, there are no cases that hold a gun manufacturer liable for gun violence. 78 underestimated the ease with which the regulatory scheme can be circumvented and they may have overestimated the ability of government agencies to enforce these regulations.").
73 (describing tracks). Next, Track C "allows the plaintiff's recovery to be reduced merely because the judgment cannot be collected from an insolvent defendant" and Track D "introduces a mathematical concept, the threshold, which serves to reduce the plaintiff's recovery in certain cases." Id. Finally, "Track E divides the plaintiff's damages into economic losses and pain and suffering, with different standards of recovery for each." Id.
88. See id. ("The Reporters' radical approach allows them to criticize joint and several liability without acknowledging the common law and underlying policies.").
rule and each one of the tracks proposed by the ALl is a distinct minority rule." 9 The states, when faced with a challenge to their concept of apportionment, should look at their own precedent rather than the Restatement (Third): Apportionment. It is an opinion piece by the authors, not a restatement of the law.N" If a state adopts one of the ALI's proposed tracks, it will further extend a modest products suit beyond the reach of the victim.
The risk created by the Restatement (Third): Apportionment is that if one of the reform tracks is adopted, it will affect every aspect of a products liability case: whether an attorney should take a case, whether he or she should settle a case and if so for how much, whether following ajudgment the plaintiff will be able to recover from joint defendants and if so how much and in applying the concept of comparative fault, how much fault will be allocated to the plaintiff. The conclusion that flows from reading the Restatement (Third): Apportionment is that injured consumers will recover less. The Restatement (Third): Apportionment will reduce the number of modest suits by decreasing the chances that the plaintiff will recover a meaningful verdict.
Several clearly wrong cases in the area of tobacco, firearms and alcohol have brought the expansion of products liability to a halt in these areas. Most importantly, the Cipollone cigarette case was wrongly decided by the Supreme Court. 9 ' In contrast to the holding, which stated that there was express preemption of design defect, a strong argument could be made that preemption (if any) was implied. 92 The tobacco manufacturers should have been held accountable. The Supreme Court could have decided the Cipollone case with vision rather than creating a technical quagmire. It should have held that with over 400,000 tobacco-caused deaths each year, there was an unprecedented product-induced epidemic in the United States, and the source of the epidemic was clear. It should have concluded the disease was entirely unnecessary and that it was appropriate to hold the cigarette manufacturers liable. The Cipollone case could have been based on design defect, failure to warn or fraud.
3
The Supreme Court should have acknowledged that over three million people, worldwide, die needlessly and, accordingly, should have taken steps to reduce this human carnage. In that case a third year medical student was mugged, raped and murdered with a small handgun. The decedent's mother brought suit against Charter Arms, the manufacturer of the handgun, and the lower court permitted recovery based on strict liability. 9 7 On appeal the Fifth Circuit held that strict liability did not apply to the manufacturer of handguns because of the criminal superceding cause and because every preceding case that applied strict liability had been related to property; a "Saturday Night Special" has no relationship to property. 9 8 The decision was wrong because the manufacturers foresaw the criminal shootings and the court's restriction of strict liability to land was tortured.
The wrongness of this handgun precedent has recently been addressed. The first important case is Hamilton v. Accu-Tek 99 , a New York case, against the manufacturers of handguns for the negligent over-saturation of the South. 'I'l The theory was that the manufacturers knew that the guns being sold in great numbers in the South were being transported to New York and Chicago and sold on the black market.' 1 Several gun manufacturers were held liable to one of the shooting victims in that case. 98. See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1268 (holding that injury must "flow directly from the activity itself alleged to be ultra hazardous").
99. 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) 100. See Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1330 (claiming gun manufacturer's marketed handguns such that they could easily be obtained illegally); see also Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 45 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that "availability of the guns... was the relevant factor for the perpetrators and victims of shootings").
101. See Hamilton, 222 F.3d at 40 (contending that plaintiffs know their products entered "illegal market [s] and are used to commit crimes").
102. See id. at 40-41 (finding three defendant gtn manufacturers liable for permanently disabled victim and his mother). Merrill, a disgruntled client acquired numerous automatic weapons and went to the office of his attorney, where he wantonly killed eight people and injured many more. 10 5 The suit against the manufacturer of the Tech-9, Navegar, argued that the manufacturer was negligent in marketing and promoting the gun because it knew of the rapid fire capacity of the gun and advertised it in publications that would appeal to people who would likely misuse the gun. The California Court of Appeals held the Tech-9 manufacturer liable for negligent marketing. 10 6 This decision has since been reversed by the California Supreme Court. 1°1 7 The Court held that it did not matter whether the case was styled in negligence or strict liability. The issue was covered by a California statute that forbid costbenefit analysis to be used in products suits against gun manufacturers. The red flag for the product-caused epidemic of handgun violence is being waved by numerous mayors throughout the country. The mayors have brought suits against the gun manufacturers in order to recover for the expenses paid by the cities to respond to the wave of gun violence. The suits are in various stages of litigation and the gun manufacturers, at present, are attempting to settle them.' 0 8 The goals of the suits are to force the gun manufacturers to take cognizance of the saturation sales, excess promotion of handguns and the fact that they have contributed to the decline of the inner cities, and to hold the manufacturers financially responsible. 109 These are not suits to ban guns, but rather to shift the loss, as in the tobacco suits, to the manufacturers. Finally, the third most dangerous product in the country is alcohol. 110 The consumption of alcohol is involved in almost every crime, numerous vehicle crashes and deaths and a very large number of domestic violence cases.'' Alcohol is, in part, responsible for large numbers of people losing their jobs, becoming divorced and committing suicide.
1 12
The courts have rejected cases brought by victims who have been injured by alcohol, however. 1 1 3 One Texas case, brought by the mother of a college girl who died from drinking a large amount of tequila, held that the manufacturers of alcohol had a duty to warn the young woman of the risk of death from the excessive consumption of alcohol.' 14 Several years later the Texas Supreme Court reversed, and held that the manufacturer of alcohol had no duty to warn the consumer of the risk of death.' 15 The rejection of these alcohol cases by the courts ignores the fact that very few consumers understand the scope of the interaction of alcohol with the human body. The purpose of this part is to manifest that various recent modifications in the law related to discovery, the presentation of evidence, punitive damages and the need for an expert witness have helped to bring about a dramatic increase in the costs of litigating a products liability case.
One of the most costly developments in the litigation of a products liability case is the almost absolute requirement that in every case an expert will be required.
12 The mothers of children who were born with congenital birth defects brought suits, alleging that these birth defects were caused by the administration of Bendectin, during the period when the limbs were being formed in the fetus. 124 The children displayed missing and shortened limbs, as well as incomplete neurological development in some cases.
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After many years of intermediate appeals, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge was the gatekeeper and had the power to evaluate the credentials of the expert witness, as well as whether his or her testimony would be of value to the jury. 12 6 Following Daubert, numerous cases rejected the plaintiffs proposed expert witness. 1 ' 2 7 Some assumed that Daubert was limited to scientific and technological cases and would not be applied to non-technical cases.1 2 8 This flawed assumption was corrected by the United States Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael. 12 9 In 1999, the Supreme Court held that Daubert applied to non-technical cases.'13 In Kumho, a tire on a minivan had exploded and the plaintiff's expert testified that the tire was defectively designed. The Court held that the gatekeeper function of the trial court applied to non-scientific testimony and that the trial court could reject the expert witness on the basis that he or she was insufficiently trained or experienced.
1 ' The significance of the Kumho decision is that the expert witness requirement now applies to all cases, scientific as well as non-scientific.' 3 2 Daubert, in conjunction with Kumho, stands for the idea that the plaintiffs expert will be carefully scrutinized in all products cases. The impact on a products case is that the price of a lawsuit has increased by the cost of the expert witness and his or her preparation for trial. Assuming that the cost of an expert is approximately $25,000, Daubert and Kumho have arguably increased the cost of presenting a products case by this amount.
One critical development that has constricted the litigation of products liability cases is the broad refusal by the courts to accept the class action concept embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 133 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.' 3 4 As illustrated by the language of the rule, small but numerous products liability cases fit the test precisely. For instance, the most obvious product for a class action suit is tobacco.1' 5 The injured smoker should be able to join with other injured smokers, as a class, and sue the tobacco manufacturers.
36 Tobacco naturally meets the requirements of a class action 1 3 7 because there are many victims and common facts. What he means by this is clear. Judge Smith means that it is appropriate for an American corporation to take over 400,000 lives a year (over three million world-wide), but it is not appropriate for the consumers who are injured or killed to take these tobacco manufacturers to court in order to shift the loss, raise the price and deter the manufacture of such a product. 143 One exception to the historical cigarette class action prohibition is the recent case in Florida, brought by numerous airline stewardesses, who argued that the smoke in the airplanes caused lung cancer for the stewardesses, none of whom smoked. 14 4 The court certified the stewardesses as a class, and they have recovered a small amount. Perhaps the court was motivated to certify the class because the stewardesses had agreed to reject damages based on their physical injury, and instead would only accept punitive damages and those would go toward research and prevention. 160 Statutes of repose provide that there is a certain time period after the date of sale of the product within which the cause of action must be brought.
1 6 1 For example, some provide that the claim must be filed within ten years of the sale of the product. If the injury occurs twelve years after the sale of the product, there is no cause of action because the statute of repose has run. These statutes have been challenged on the basis they violate the equal protection clause and the access to court provisions of the state constitutions.'
62 Fortunately the statutes of repose are only important in a small number of cases-those relating to heavy equipment such as bulldozers and presses, which last for more than ten years-and have little effect on most consumer products, which generally cause injury within the first three years of ownership.
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Protracted discovery in products cases has helped to expand the cost of litigation. A recent article by Professors George Shepherd and Morgan Cloud argues that discovery is the reason for the explosion in the costs of
See Elizabeth Gleick, Tobacco Blues: The Tobacco Industry Has Never Lost a Lawsuit but a New Billion Dollar Legal Assault and a High-Ranking Defector May Change
That, TIME, Mar. 11, 1996, at 54 (noting that Liggett Group has already spent $75 million defending lawsuit and was prepared to spend even more). VHLANovA LAW REVIEW litigating all cases-including products cases. 164 The authors reason that, since it is risky for either side to avoid lengthy discovery, many cases have now become prohibitively expensive. 165 They conclude that discovery has "weighted the scales of justice against some of society's most vulnerable groups" and that this increased financial burden of discovery has made litigation unaffordable for many people.1 66 The plaintiff in a products liability suit must face the risk that if he or she is successful in winning punitive damages, large portions of the award may be taken away from him or her. In a recent case, BMW v. Gore,' 6 7 involving fraud on the part of BMW in failing to inform consumers that the manufacturer had repainted portions of brand-new BMWs, the plaintiff recovered a two million dollar punitive damage award in the state court. 168 On appeal the United States Supreme Court held that the award violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 69 In deciding whether a punitive damage award is excessive and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will look at three factors. 1 7 11 One is the nature of the injury. Is it based on economic loss or personal injury? The value of the BMW was decreased because of the new paint job. This is an economic loss. Because many products liability cases involve personal injury, a victim may be able to argue that the holding in BMW, resting on economic loss, does not apply. The second factor to be considered by the Court in deciding whether the punitive award is excessive is the ratio of punitive damages to out-of-pocket losses. ' 72 The Court suggested that a ratio of four to one, or perhaps in extreme cases ten to one, might be appropriate, but anything larger is suspect. 173 Finally, the Court suggested that the amount of punitive damages should bear some relationship to the criminal penalty for that type of conduct, and in the BMWcase the most that could be awarded 164 170. See id. at 576-85 (defining generally three aggravating factors that must be present for punitive damages award).
See
171. See id. at 575 (stating that "some wrongs are more blameworthy than others").
172. See id. at 580-81 (declaring that "exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relationship to compensating damages").
See id. (endorsing various "reasonable" ratios).
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Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2003] , Art. 3 http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss3/3 as a fine was $10,000. 174 Recent cases suggest that BMW will not be applied to products cases. 175 Several states including Georgia, have statutes that return a large percentage of the punitive damages obtained in a products liability case to the state. 1 7 6 The Georgia statute provides that 75% of the punitive damage award goes to the state rather than the victim. 1 7 7 Instead of slapping the hands of the defendant for producing a defective product that maims or kills, the hands of the victim's attorney are slapped for obtaining justice for his or her client. The message from the legislature to Georgia attorneys is clear: Do not take products cases, do not represent injured consumers.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Numerous factors affect the calculations by the plaintiff's attorney in deciding whether to accept a products case. The impact of the theoretical and procedural reforms since 1980 is that the plaintiff's attorney will likely refuse to accept many modest products liability cases because he or she believes he or she will lose the case or that if he or she wins, the victory will not cover his or her out-of-pocket expenses. There are several possible solutions to this virtual closing of the courthouse doors to modest products cases.
First, follow the "superfund" model for toxic spills and assess the corporations that produce the largest amount of recurring damage and the most severe losses in products cases. The money would be used to fund a program that would provide justice in modest products cases. 17 8 The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) has become widely referred to as "superfund" because it "establishes a multi-billion dollar 'hazardous substance response trust fund"' as a means of financing governmental cleanups of hazardous chemical waste spills and sites. 17 9 CERCLA is funded in part by the govern-litigable, damages with no forum for relief. It has resulted in huge windfall profits for manufacturers to the extent of injuries multiplied by the number of occurrences. A solution for the millennium is needed that will provide a venue to compensate the injured consumers and deter the manufacture of defective products. 
